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Associations: Partnerships Taxable As
Corporations
ALVIN B. RUBIN*
An ever increasing awareness of the possibilities of tax saving
devices has prompted innumerable legal practitioners to experiment
with means to reduce tax incidence upon business enterprises. Since
some business men can reduce their overall tax load by conducting
their affairs as a partnership, instead of as a corporation,' many new
businesses are being created as partnerships, and many existing cor-
porations have been, and are being dissolved to obtain the resultant
tax savings.
But when there are several owners of a business, certain ad-
vantages are likely to be derived from devices generally obtained
through the corporate form of doing business. Thus, for example, in
many businesses, centralized contr6l is desirable, if not necessary.
Limited liability is obviously appealing. And it is desirable to avoid
interruption of the business by the death of one of the entrepreneurs.
So there are impelling reasons for attempting to achieve these ends-
allowable in most cases under state laws-while remaining ostensibly
a partnership for state and federal tax purposes.
This is ingenious. It may be sound business practice. But in
other cases ingenuity is likely to overreach itself. For there is an ap-
parently innocuous clause contained in the "definitions" sections of
the Internal Revenue Code to the effect that "The term 'corpora-
tion' includes associations, joint stock companies, and insurance
companies."2
The definition of a partnership gives an inkling that there may
be something more to "corporation" for federal tax purposes than
meets the eye. For "The term 'partnership' includes . . . [any]
unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is
*Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See, for example, Rabkin and Johnson, The Partnership under the Federal
Tax Laws (1942) 55 Howard L. Rev. 909.
2. C. C. H., I. R. C. § 3797 (a) (3) (1947).
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not within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corpora-
tion."'
The code itself does not state a definition for an "association."
The regulations, however, are more helpful to the understanding,
albeit not to the purpose of achieving at one and the same time the
advantages of a clever business form together with a minimum tax
liability. They state that "The term 'Association' is not used in the
Internal Revenue Code in any narrow or technical sense. It includes
any organization, created for the transaction of designated affairs ...
which, like a corporation, continues notwithstanding that its mem-
bers or participants change, and the affairs of which, like corporate
affairs, are conducted by a single individual, a committee, a board,
or some other group, acting in a representative capacity."4
"If an organization is not interrupted by the death of a mem-
ber, or by a change in ownership of a participating interest during
the agreed period of its existence, and its management is central-
ized in one or more persons in their representative capacities, such
an organization is an association, taxable as a corporation,"5 for
"The Internal Revenue Code provides its own concept of a partner-
ship."'
These elaborated definitions are not overreaching. Their validity
has been sustained.7 And it makes no difference what state law may
choose to call a particular form of business venture: the Internal
Revenue Code "provides its own concept."'
That, of course, means that what is a partnership, with perhaps
unlimited liability, under state law, becomes an association, hence
a corporation, for federal tax purposes. That means, too, that in
8. C. C. H., I. R. C. § 3797 (a) (2) (1947).
4. C. C. H., Income Tax Reg. 111, § 29.3797-4 (1947).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344, 56 S. Ct. 289, 80 L. Ed.
263 (1935); Sherman v. Commissioner, 146 F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944).
See also Trust No. 5833, Security-First National Bank v. Welch, 54 F. (2d)
323 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), cert. denied 286 U. S. 544, 52 S. Ct. 496, 76 L. Ed.
1281 (1931).
8. See Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 S.
Ct. 48, 70.L. Ed. 183 (1925); Johnson v. Commissioner, 56 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932); Commissioner v. Fortney Oil Co., 125 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 6th,
1942). In' Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 1016 (C. C. A.
8th, 1945), the very taxpayer there held to be an association had previously been
held a partnership in a state court. See also Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. Com-
missioner, 88 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Tyrell v. Commissioner, 91 F.
(2d) 500 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), cert. denied 302 U. S. 747, 58 S. Ct. 265, 82 L.
Ed. 577 (1937).
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many attempts to create tax savings, there may be a weakening of
business structure, without the slightest reduction in tax liability.
What the category of "association" does is "to impose a fair share of
the whole burden of taxation upon business organizations which,
although not operating under corporate form, nevertheless are en-
gaged in making or creating profits in much the same way that
corporations carry on business activity."9 On the other hand, not
every partnership which deviates from the norm should automatic-
ally be classified as an association. The attempt to trace the shadow
line which divides the association and the partnership is a subject
which-among the excellent material dealing with the taxation of
partnerships'°-has been strangely neglected."
Merten's treatise states that, "It is very difficult to draw a satis-
factory dividing line .... The line cannot be drawn upon the basis
of the laws of any particular state; nor can it be drawn upon the
basis of provisions as to dissolution and admission of new members.
The basic test is whether an organization which may be thought to
be a partnership conducts business in the general form and manner
of a corporation: if it does, it will be taxed as a corporation."12
Despite this difficulty, a reading of the many cases on the sub-
ject induces a belief that identifiable factors are of strong evidentiary
value in establishing whether a business form is sufficiently akin to
the corporation to be taxable as one. Cases dealing with the closely
related problem of when a trust is an "association" and therefore
taxable as a corporation are helpful, and have been utilized in some
of the references in this article.
In Burk-Waggoner Association v. Hopkins," the Supreme
Court for the first time held that an unincorporated joint stock
association constitutionally could and statutorily should be taxed as
a corporation. The court remarked, in advancing its reasons, that
joint stock associations conduct their business in the general form
9. Equitable Trust v. Magruder, 37 F. Supp. 711 (D. C. Md. 1941).
10. On the general problems of partnership taxation, see Rabkin and Johnson,
supra note 1; Levy, The Incorporation of Partnerships (1947) 25 Taxes 43;
Schiller, The Lawyer's Dilemma (1946) 24 Taxes 837; Paul, Partnerships in Tax
Avoidance (1945) 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 121; Ross, The Status of the Family
Partnership under the Recent Decisions (1945) 4 N. Y. U. Institute on Fed.
Tax. 674.
11. A good annotation, however, is available in 108 A. L. R. 340 (1937). See
also 144 A. L. R. 1050 (1943).
12. 7a Mertens, Law of Federal Taxation, § 43.30.
13. Supra note 8. In Hebert v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144, 44 S. Ct. 462, 68 L.
Ed. 949 (1924) the Supreme Court had held a "Massachusetts trust" taxable
as a corporation since it was an "association."
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and mode of procedure of a corporation. "Because of this resem-
blance in form and effectiveness, these business organizations are
subjected by the Act to these taxes as corporations."' 4
That settled the question for formal joint stock associations. In
1935, the Morrissey case posed the issue of whether a trust could be
considered an association, when it was operating a golf club, and
when its beneficiaries had no voice in the management of its af-
fairs.'" The court held the trust taxable as a corporation. It decided
at the same time that certain other types of trusts were also taxable
as corporations,"6 although they had a limited number of benefi-
ciaries. 7
Although none of the Supreme Court cases have involved part-
nerships, strictly speaking, they have stressed that a business which
is conducted like a corporation may be taxed like one. And in de-
termining what functional aspects of corporate organization are
most characteristic, the Supreme Court has stressed centralized
management. 8
CENTRALIZATION OF MANAGEMENT
This is, as the regulations indicate, a basic issue. In the "normal"
partnership, the power to determine fundamental policies of the
business is held by all the partners or co-owners. Each votes on every
basic matter. Only minor matters, the day-to-day conduct of affairs,
is entrusted to employees or to one or more partners, acting for all.
In the typical corporation, on the other hand, it is the board of di-
rectors, acting as representatives of the stockholders, which charts
business policy.
Both the regulations and the decisions have therefore relied
heavily on a preliminary test: Is there centralized management by
persons acting in a representative capacity?'"
14. 296 U. S. 344, 56 S. Ct. 289, 80 L. Ed. 263 (1935).
15. Ibid.
16. Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 362, 56 S. Ct. 283, 80 L. Ed. 273
(1935); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U. S. 369, 56 S. Ct. 285,
80 L. Ed. 278 (1935). Compare A. A. Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U. S.
385, 57 S. Ct. 799, 81 L. Ed. 1174, (1935).
17. Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 362, 56 S. Ct. 283, 80 L. Ed.
273 (1935).
18. See, for example, in addition to the cases already cited, Helvering v.
Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U. S. 369, 56 S. Ct. 285, 80 L. Ed. 278 (1935).
19. See Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 156(C. C. A. 8th, 1937) where management of the venture was centralized in a
single person. See also Bert v. Helvering, 67 App. D. C. 340, 92 F. (2d) 491
(1937). Compare A. A. Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U. S. 385, 57 S. Ct.
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TRANSFERABILITY OF INTERESTS
A second basic test announced by the regulations is whether the
business unit is interrupted by the death of a member or by a change
in ownership of an interest. In the "typical" partnership, the mem-
bers are drawn together by their personal evaluations each of the
other. Partners contribute personality as well as capital. On the other
hand, in the corporation the stockholder's primary contribution is
financial. Therefore, in the "typical" partnership, the sale of a part-
ner's interest dissolves the business unit as it previously existed,
whereas in the corporation, the shares representing capital contribu-
tion are freely negotiated."0 Likewise in the "normal" partnership,
the death of one of the partners terminates the enterprise, at least
as it previously existed, while the corporation achieves continuity of
life despite the death of its stockholders.
OTHER FACTORS
Centralization of management and the accomplishment of con-
tinuity of business life despite transfers of ownership or death of the
business investors are the only criteria mentioned in the regulations.
The cases, however, indicate that perhaps they are not exclusive.
The courts have consistently considered other matters in an effort
to appraise whether or not a particular business unit more closely
follows the corporate method of doing business than it does the
orthodox partnership method, and whether it is therefore an "asso-
ciation." As the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit put
it in the Brouillard case, decided in 1934: "In determining whether
the entity is a partnership or an association, there should be a bal-
ancing of resemblances and contrasts, since Congress evidently
intended to tax as a corporation, only partnerships conducting busi-
ness by corporate methods and forms."21
This "balancing of resemblances and contrasts" to get the "feel"
of a particular business unit is widely-indeed, almost universally-
799, 81 L. Ed. 1174 (1937). Where a single "manager" is appointed, it may be
indicative of partnership that his powers are expressly limited. Commissioner v.
A. B. Whitcomb Coca-Cola Syndicate, 35 B. T. A. 1031 (1937), affirmed 95 F.
(2d) 596 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
20. For typical cases where an association was found to exist at least partly
because of an effort to make investment interests freely transferable, see
Bert v. Helvering, 67 App. D. C. 340, 92 F. (2d) 491 (1937).
21. Commissioner v. Brouillard, 70 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934), cert.
denied 293 U. S. 574, 55 S. Ct. 85, 79 L. Ed. 672 (1934). See also Bert v.
Helvering, 67 App. D. C. 340, 92 F. (2d) 491 (1937); Glensder Textile Co. v.
Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 176 (1942).
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used by all of the courts, including the tax court. Some of the re-
semblances and contrasts which they have considered include the
following:
EFFORTS To LIMIT LIABILITY
The regulations clearly state that the limitation of liability of
some of the members of a partnership, in accordance with state laws
authorizing the creation of limited partnerships, or partnerships in
commendam, does not per se make the business unit an association.
22
But, since incorporation means universal limited liability in most
cases, and since partnership generally implies at least someone with
unlimited liability, efforts to maintain a partnership and yet to limit
the liability of all the members, among themselves, if not against
outside creditors, are enough to create suspicion that there is an asso-
ciation, whereas a lack of such efforts ordinarily creates a feeling
that the business unit is really a partnership.24
PUBLIC APPEARANCE
A business which is actually incorporated is generally required
by state laws to indicate in its firm name that it is a corporation. A
business which under state law is a partnership but holds itself forth
as a corporation, for whatever reason, is likely to be using its tech-
nical business form as a subterfuge. Therefore when an unincor-
porated firm indicates to customers, creditors, or the public that it
is a corporation or fails to indicate that it is not a corporation, that
may be evidence that it is at least an association.23 Certainly when
a corporation is dissolved and a partnership created, the change
should be clearly announced to the world if classification as a part-
nership rather than a corporation is sought. 6
22. C. C. H., Income Tax Reg. 111, § 29.3797-5. See also Wholesalers
Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). See also
I. T. 2904,.XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 151 (1935); 0. D. 599, 8 Cum. Bull. 15 (1921);
S. 1160, 1 Cum. Bull. 5 (1922). But see T. D. 2941, 1 Cum. Bull. 9 (1922);
G. C. M. 2467, VII-2 Cum. Bull. 188 (1926).
23. See Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 1016
(C. C. A. 8th, 1945), where the provision that no partner should be responsible for
partnership debts until all of the partnership property had been liquidated was
considered "inconsistent with ordinary partnerships." But see 1. T. 1849, 11-2
Cum. Bull. 6 (1923); S. 1361, 2 Cum. Bull. 11 (1920).
24. See Hoffman v. United States, 21 F. (2d) 241 (D. C. Ill. 1927).
25. See H. Lisoner Co., Inc. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 1058 (Ct. of Cl.
1931) where the taxpayer contended it had been an "Association during a brief
period." In ruling against this contention, the Court relied on the absence of
evidence that it had held itself out as an "association" or corporation.
26. See Jackson-Wermick Trust v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 150 (1931).
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OBSERVANCE OF CORPORATE RITUAL
The corporation is a far more formal sort of business organiza-
tion than the partnership. It names officers; it keeps formal written
records of meetings; it adopts resolutions; it generally has a seal; it
has an identity apart from that of its stockholders. This sort of cere-
mony is generally absent from the partnership. Evidence of the
existence or non-existence of such ceremony will be considered in
determining whether a business is an association.27 Even the exist-
ence or non-existence of formal documents serving as evidence of
the investment of capital ("shares" or "certificates") may be per-
suasive."
OTHER INDICIA
Corporations are ordinarily created for long terms. Partnerships,
or their tax companions, joint ventures, frequently are formed for
stated brief periods. The fact that a business venture "was limited
[in duration] to a short period has some tendency to distinguish it
from a corporation."2 Of course, brief life indicates a lack of con-
27. See Seattle Renton Lumber Co. v. United States, 135 F. (2d) 989
(C. C. A. 9th, 1943), where the court was influenced by the taxpayer's showing
that it had opened a new set of books, changed signs on its place of business
and vehicles, ordered altered stationery, and had verbally informed customers
who inquired of the change in name that the business was now being handled as
a partnership. On the other hand, where there was no change of name or books,
etc., this was cited as evidence of existence of an "association." Poplar Bluff
Printing Co. v. Commissioner,,149 F. (2d) 1016 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945).
28. See Commissioner v. Brouillard, 70 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934),
cert. denied 293 U. S. 574, 55 S. Ct. 85, 79 L. Ed. 672 (1934), relying in part
upon an absence of such circumstances to hold that a group which pooled oil
leases for development in the hands of a trustee was. not an association. See
also Commissioner v. Rector & Davidson, 111 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
Compare the relatively early case of Niles Fire Brick Co., 6 B. T. A. 8 (1927)
(Non-acq.) where a group of heirs commenced formation of a corporation but
never completed it. See also Joe Gilorich & Co., 6 B. T. A. 864 (1927) (Acq.)
where organizational informality was stressed. Accord: Myers, Long & Co. v.
Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 460 (1928). See also Doral Trading Account v.
Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 837 (1936); Stantex Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,
38 B. T. A. 269 (1938); MacConaughey v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. 408 (1940);
P-H Group v. Commissioner, 43 B. T. A. 1041 (1941). In connection with the
related trust problem, see United States v. Davidson, 115 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940); Commissioner v. Nebo Oil Co. Trust, 126 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 10th,
1942), cert. denied 317 U. S. 636, 63 S. Ct. 27, 87 L. Ed. 512 (1942); Keating
Snyder Trust v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
29. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344, 56 S. Ct. 289, 80 L. Ed.
263 (1935): "The test of an association is not to be found in the mere formal
evidence of interests or in a particular method of transfer, yet the absence of
familiar provisions for adequate evidence of transfer is important to be con-
sidered." See also Commissioner v. Gerstle, 95 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938);
Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 1016 (C. C. A. 8th,
1945); Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 176 (1942).
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tinuity of operation."0 Likewise, whether the investors vote by
"heads" or in ratio to their proportionate investments may be of per-
suasive value."' And the extent of the activity of some so-called
"partners" may be considered. 2
Of course, occasionally the rules set up to prevent ostensible
partnerships from escaping federal corporate tax liability may work
to the advantage of the business unit, rather than otherwise. Thus,
in the Wild case33 where more tax would have been collected had
the business venture been considered a partnership, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the business was not a
partnership, whatever else it might be, and therefore that the mem-
bers of it were not taxable on profits realized by the business but not
distributed to them.
Where the terms under which the business is organized and
under which it is to be conducted are reduced to a formal document,
but the actual conduct of affairs varies from what was formally
authorized, should the taxability of the business depend on what is
written or on what is actually done? For this question, there are
answers in dicta both ways, depending apparently on how the court
confronted with a particular case otherwise felt about the matter.34
Consequently, there is tax advantage neither in understating the re-
semblance to a corporation in the formal documents, nor in over-
stating it.
To aid the reader in considering how the two major tests and
the various other items of evidence discussed may add up to a de-
termination that a particular business is either a partnership or an
association, a group of fourteen more or less typical cases has been
30. See Commissioner v. N. B. Whitcomb Coca-Cola Syndicate, 35 B. T. A.
1031 (1937), affirmed in 95 F. (2d) 596 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). See also Utica
Motor Car Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 878 (1928); Doral Trading Account
v. Commissioner, 34 B. T. A. 837 (1936).
31. Pierre S. Dupont v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 1198 (1938), affirmed
118 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941); Cord v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 1372(1938); MacConaughey v. Commissioner, 48 B. T. A. 408 (1940).
32. See Commissioner v. J. A. Riggs Tractor Co., 6 T. C. 889 (1946) (Acq.).
See also A. R. R. 2773, 11-2 Cum. Bull. 1 (1923).
33. Wild v. Commissioner, 62 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1933).
34. The terms of the instrument control: Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v.
Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Bert v. Helvering, 67 App.
D. C. 340, 92 F. (2d) 491, 493 (1937); Commissioner v. Security-First Nat. Bank
of Los Angeles, 148 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945). It is what was actually
done, rather than what might have been done, which counts: Commissioner v.
Brouillard, 70 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934), cert. denied 293 U. S. 574,
55 S. Ct. 85, 79 L. Ed. 672 (1934); Commissioner v. Rector & Davidson, 111 F.(2d) 332 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. denied 311 U. S. 672, 61 S. Ct. 33, 85 L.
Ed. 432 (1940).
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classified in tabular form at the conclusion of this article. It should
be noted in examining this chart that, although the answers to the
first two criteria are strongly indicative, the other evidence will be
weighed, and the final result is generally predicated on a considera-
tion of all the evidence available. Cases involving groups of indiv-
iduals combining their capital for short or long term investments
or speculation in securities" and those involving combinations of
capital for the development of mineral leases36 have been the most
frequently litigated, and the footnotes to this sentence contain refer-
ences to a number of the decisions in those matters.
If there is a "word to the wise," it is that, if a partnership is
being formed, either "from scratch" or by the dissolution of an
existing corporation, there is a possibility that provisions which may
be wholly innocuous under state laws may be tantamount to inviting
federal taxation as a corporation. If a bona fide partnership is being
created and taxation as an association is sought to be avoided, it is
well to draw up formal articles of partnership to indicate beyond
question what sort of business unit is being created. Centralized
35. Wild v. Commissioner, 62 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ( not a partner-
ship); Glenmore Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F. (2d) 780 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1933) (not a partnership); Wholksalers Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner,
88 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) (association); Bert v. Helvering, 67 App.
D. C. 340, 92 F. (2d) 491 (1937) (association); Commissioner v. Gerstle, 95 F.
(2d) 587 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (not an association); Commissioner v. N. B.
Whitcomb Coca-Cola Syndicate, 35 B. T. A. 1031 (1937), affirmed 95 F. (2d)
596 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (not association); Realty Associates, 17 B. T. A. 1173:
(1929) (non-acq.) (no association); Doral Trading Account v. Commissioner,
34 B. T. A. 837 (1936) (set up to acquire one block of stock; not an association);.
Schroeder Employees Thrift Club v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 645 (1937)
(association); Farish v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 1114 (1937), reversed on other
grounds 103 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (not association); Pierre S. Dupont
v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 1198 (1938), affirmed 118 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1941) (joint venture taxable as partnership); Cord v. Commissioner, 38,
B. T. A. 1372 (1938) (not association); MacConaughey v. Commissioner, 41
B. T. A. 408 (1940) (to acquire then dispose of all stock of one company).
(not association); P-H Group v. Commissioner, 43 B. T. A. 1041 (1941) (not
association); Wilmot v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 1155 (1941).
36. Commissioner v. Brouillard, 70 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934), cert.
denied 293 U. S. 574, 55 S. Ct. 85, 79 L. Ed. 672 (trust); Thrash Lease Trust v,
Commissioner, 99 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied 306 U. S. 654,
59 S. Ct. 643, 83 L. Ed. 1052 (1939) (association); Commissioner v. Horseshoe
Lease Syndicate, 110 F. (2d) 748 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. denied 311 U. S. 672,
666, 61 S. Ct. 24, 85 L. Ed. 427 (1940) (not association) ; Commissioner v. Rector
and Davidson, 111 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); cert. denied 311 U. S. 672,
61 S. Ct. 33, 85 L. Ed. 432 (1940) (not association); Commissioner v. Fortney'
Oil Co., 125 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942) (association); Myers, Long & Co.
v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 460 (1928) (partnership); Winston v. Commissioner,
22 B. T. A. 1194 (1931) (partnership); G. E. Jordan v. Commissioner, 28 B. T. A.
372 (1933) (not a trust); Stantex Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A.
269 (1938) (not association); Everts v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 1039 (1938)
(not association); Johnston v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 1199 (1938) (not
association).
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management should not be combined with provisions insuring rela-
tively continuous life to the business unit. If one factor is indispen-
sable, the other should be avoided, both in appearance and fact. If it
is essential to retain some medium whereby interests may be trans-
ferred, the articles of partnership should provide for acceptance of
the personality of a proposed transferee of an interest by the present
partners by means of some formal procedure for consent in writing."
If some partners are to have limited liability, the fact that there
are no limitations of 'liability as to others should be stated clearly.
Attempts to limit the liability of the partners, as among themselves,
to what is invested, indicate the association.
Ordinarily, it will not detract one whit from the desired busi-
ness purposes of a partnership to indicate clearly that it is a 'partner-
ship or at least to avoid any appearance that it is a corporation in its
business name, on its stationery and business signs. In addition, it is
well to avoid titles, such as "president," and the ceremony of reso-
lutions and the like. 8
Ultimately, this means of course that you cannot have all the
tax advantages of a partnership and yet retain the business and legal
advantages of a corporation. This indeed is as it should be. If a tax-
payer wants the advantages of the corporation, let the taxpayer pay
corporate taxes. A business which desires to be taxed as a partnership
should bear a reasonable relationship in its method of doing business
to a "normal" partnership. However, if a partnership is desired, care-
ful consideration of its structure and business methods can generally
accomplish an effective organization for business and legal purposes
and yet fall short of the corporate resemblance necessary to make it
an association. It is of no moment under the present Internal Rev-
enue Code whether a business is conducted as a corporation or as a
partnership solely because of tax advantages attendant 'upon one
form or the other. 8 The taxpayer may weigh the advantages of the
,forms available and choose between them without penalty for his
motive. 9 What is of moment is that the business unit which acts
like a corporation must expect to be treated like one.
87. See Hoffman v. United States, 21 F. (2d) 241 (D. C. Ill., 1927).
88. See, for example, Jordan Creek Placers v. Commissioner, 43 B. T. A.
131 (1940).
39. See Seattle Renton Lumber Co. v. United States, 135 F. (2d) 989
C. C. A. 9th, 1943).
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